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THE DEFENSE OF NECESSITY IN CRIMINAL LAW: THE RIGHT TO
CHOOSE THE LESSER EVIL
EDWARD B. ARNOLDS* AND NORMAN F. GARLANDt
Introduction
Criminal defendants who intentionally and
knowingly violate a criminal statute may never-
theless claim that they have committed no crime.
These defendants make this assertion even though
they admit committing the act and possessing the
mental element proscribed by the law. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held
that a member of the United States Naval Re-
serve Force, on duty as a despatch driver, was not
amenable to the speed laws of the state while on
his way to deliver a message, at the command of
his superior officer, which that officer deemed
urgent.' The decision rested on the principal of
public necessity, a principle which the court stated
is "without application to cases which show a
failure to comply with our laws and ordinances
when no military necessity exists." 2
This holding is an example of the application of
the defense of necessity. The defendant admitted
intentionally exceeding the speed limit knowing
the act was illegal. But under the pressure of cir-
cumstances the act was justified by "necessity."
The National Commission on Reform of Fed-
eral Criminal Laws considered whether or not to
codify the defense of necessity in the Proposed
New Federal Criminal Code. The Commissioners
initially adopted the defense as it is usually de-
fined by the courts and legislatures.' However, in
* J. D., Northwestern University, 1973.
t J. D., Northwestern University, 1964; L.L.M.,
Georgetown University, 1965, presently Associate Pro-
fessor of Law at Northwestern University.
' State v. Burton, 41 R.I. 303, 103 A. 962 (1918).
2Id. at 305, 103 A. at 963.
3 Conduct which Avoids Greater Harm. Conduct is
justified if it is necessary and appropriate to avoid
harm clearly greater than the harm which might
result from such conduct and the situation devel-
oped through no fault of the actor. The necessity
and justifiability of such conduct may not rest upon
considerations pertaining only to the morality and
advisability of the penal statute defining the of-
fense, either in its general application or with re-
spect to its application to a particular class of
cases arising thereunder.
UNITED STATES COiMUSSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL
the Final Report they rejected this definition of
the defense in favor of partial codification. Section
601 (1) of the Final Report thus provides: "Except
as otherwise provided, justification or excuse under
this chapter is a defense." 4
This article will discuss the issue of codifying
the defense of necessity. It will initially review the
policy reasons and elements of that defense. It
will then analyze two alternatives to a plea of
necessity, jury nullification and prosecutorial dis-
cretion, to test their adequacy where a defendant
makes a non-frivolous claim that he or she com-
mitted the otherwise criminal act to preserve some
higher value. Finally, the article will discuss the
effect codifying the defense will have on the right
of the jury to determine the issue of relative values.
I. Definitions and Policy Factors
At the outset it is necessary to distinguish the
defense of necessity from other related defenses
to avoid confusion over labels. Glanville Williams
defined necessity in the manner used in this article:
"By necessity is meant the assertion that conduct
promotes some value higher than the value of
literal compliance with the law." 5
Courts sometimes use the term justification as a
synonym for necessity.' justification, however, is
a generic term which may comprise besides neces-
sity, the defense of self-defense, defense of others,
defense of property, or execution of official duty.7
To justify does not mean to excuse; justification
is a circumstance which actually exists and which
makes harmful conduct proper and noncriminal,
while excuse is a circumstance which excuses the
actor from criminal liability even though the actor
CRfNAL ConE, § 608 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
STuoy DRAFT].4
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMSSION ON
REORM or FEDERAL C wmMNAL LAWS § 601 (1) (1971)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].5 G. Wnxmtws, THE CRMNAL LAW § 229 (2nd ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as Wnuxs, CRIMINAL LAW].6 See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515
(9th Cir. 1972).
7 FINAL REPORT §§ 606-608, .supra note 4. See also
IV. LAFAvE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRMINAL LAW
§§ 47-57 (1972).
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was technically not justified in doing what he
did." Examples of excuses are mistake and duress.9
The rationale behind the excuse defenses was
stated by Mr. Justice Holmes: "Detached reflec-
tion cannot be expected in the presence of an up-
lifted knife." 10 The rationale behind the justifica-
tion defense is that one should not be punished
where his act of breaking the law prevents more
evil than it causes."' The difference is the same as
between being forgivably wrong and being right
or between being pardoned and being praised.
Neither pardon, mitigation nor excuse can sub-
stitute for justification for where a person has
acted meritoriously (justification) he has no need
of forgiveness.
Courts also sometimes confuse the justification
defense of necessity with the excuse defense of
duress. 2 If one commits an otherwise illegal act
owing to the unlawful threats of another, the de-
fense is duress, sometimes called compulsion, fear,
or coercion (though coercion technically applies
only to the defense by a wife that she was forced
by her husband). 3 The general rule is that a well-
founded fear of death or serious bodily injury is a
defense to any criminal charge except murder.
14
8 See FINAL REPORT § 601, supra note 4.
9 FINAL REPORT §§ 610-11, supra note 4.
10 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
" SToy DRAFT § 608, supra note 3.
" See, e.g., United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 391
n.13 (7th Cir. 1971) ("The rule is the same whether the
label is 'compulsion,' 'coercion,' or 'necessity'...").
1 See Perkins, The Doctrine of Coercion, 19 IowA L.
REv. 507 (1934); Note, The Doctrine of Martial Coer-
cion, 29 TEIPE L.Q. 190 (1956).
14 R. I. Recreation Center v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1949); Shannon v.
United States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935); Arp v.
State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 So. 301 (1893); State v. Sappienza,
84 Ohio 63,95 N.E. 381 (1911); Contra, Regina v. Tyler,
[1838] 8 C&P 616 (per Lord Denman); 2 STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF TH CR-MINAL LAW 108 (1883) ("[Alt the
moment when temptation to crime is strongest ... the
law should speak most clearly to the contrary.").
In Georgia and Texas compulsion is a defense even
to murder. Jones v. State, 207 Ga. 379, 62 S.E.2d 187
(1950); Montford v. State, 144 Ga. 582, 87 S.E. 797
(1916); Burns v. State, 89 Ga. 527, 15 S.E. 748 (1892);
Beal v. Georgia, 72 Ga. 200 (1883); Turner v. State, 117
Tex. Crim. 434, 37 S.W.2d 747 (1931); Paris v. State,
35 Tex. Crim. 82, 31 S.W. 855 (1895).
In other jurisdictions compulsion instructions have
been given in murder cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Bevans, 29 F. Cas. 1138 (No. 14,589) (C.C. Mass.
1816); People v. Lighting, 83 Ill. App. 2d 430, 228
N.E.2d 104 (1967); People v. Repke, 103 Mich. 459,
61 N.W. 861 (1895); Rizzolo v. Commonwealth, 126
Pa. 54, 17 A. 520 (1889). Cf. Leonard v. State, 217 Ala.
60, 114 So. 798 (1927); State v. Clay, 220 Ia. 1191,
264 N.W. 77 (1935).
See generally Newman and Weitzer, Duress, Free Will
and Criminal Law, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 313 (1954)
One explanation of the defense of duress is the
free will theory: a person is not guilty of an offense
by reason of conduct performed under pressure so
great as to deprive an ordinary person of his free
will under the circumstances. 15 Other commenta-
tors contend that the rationale for the defense of
duress is deterrence: there is no likely deterrence
when the punishment threatened is less motivating
than the harm which the actor would suffer if he
does not commit the "crime." 16 Under either the-
ory courts limit the defense of duress to fear of
serious bodily injury or death and make the de-
fense personal to the person threatened.17 It makes
no sense, however, to put those restrictions on the
defense of necessity, since necessity is a justifica-
tion and not an excuse."8
[hereinafter cited as Newman and Weitzer]; Hersey and
Avins, Compulsion as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 11
OKLA. L. REv. 544 (1917); Hitchler, Duress as a Defense
in Criminal Cases, 4 VA. L. REv. 519 (1917) [hereinafter
cited as Hitchler].
" See Newman and Weitzer, supra note 14.
16 See Hitchler, supra note 14, at 521-22.
17 See generally Newman and Weitzer, supra note 14.
But see Rex v. Steane, [19471 K.B. 997; R. I. Recreation
Center v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 177 F.2d
603, 606 (1st Cir. 1949) (Magruder, J., concurring);
STEIN, CoAM NT ON JUSTIFICATION AND ExcusE, 1
WORXING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL ComMssION ON
REF Rm OF FEmERAL CRiMNAL LAWS at 273-79 (sug-
gesting threats to third persons should also be a de-
fense).
18 The confusion of duress and necessity has resulted
in an improper limitation being put on the defense of
necessity. See, e.g., United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d
386, 391, n.13 (7th Cir. 1971):
The general rule on 'compulsion' was stated, citing
numerous state cases, in Shannon v. United States,
76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935):
'Coercion which will excuse the commission of a
criminal act must be immediate, and of such nature
as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily injury if the act is not done.
One who has full opportunity to avoid the act
without danger of that kind cannot invoke the
doctrin of coercion and is not entitled to an instruc-
tion submitting that question to the jury.' The rule
is the same whether the label is 'compulsion,''coercion,' or 'necessity,'-See United States v.
Anthony, 145 F. Supp. 323, 339 (M.D. Pa. 1956);
R. I. Recreation Center v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949): 'But
to provide an excuse the compulsion must be pres-
ent, immediate and impending, and of such nature
as to induce a well-founded fear of death or at
least serious bodily injury.'
Compare R. PERKIs, CRnINAL LAW, 956 (2d ed.
1969):
Where the act done was necessary, or reasonably
seemed to be necessary, to save life or limb or
health, and did not in itself in any way endanger
life, limb or health, the exculpatory effect of the
necessity is too clear for argument; but where the
offense charged is not one of particular gravity the
courts have not hesitated to recognize necessity as
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The U. S. National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Law, probably to avoid the
semantic difficulties engendered by the term neces-
sity, chose to refer to the defense as conduct-which-
avoids-greater evil in the Study Draft of the pro-
posed criminal code. 9 But the defense is more
commonly referred to simply as the defense of
necessity, and that term will be employed herein.
II. History and Elements of Necessity as a Defense
Although the proposition is not beyond dispute,
2
1
it seems dear that necessity was a defense at com-
mon law. There are few cases dealing with neces-
sity, probably because these cases often are not
prosecuted. Because there are so few cases, the
law of necessity is poorly developed in Anglo-
American jurisprudence 1 Contributing difficulties
axe the sematics problems noted above and the
frequent failure of judges to discuss the doctrine
in terms of relevant principles.n As a consequence,
it is impossible to demonstrate with any degree of
satisfaction an historical development of the law
of necessity. Similarly, it is difficult, absent stat-
utes, to state with certainty in what jurisdictions
the defense as defined above is dearly recognized.
Legal commentators have not agreed on the
development of the defense. Sir James Stephen
thought the defense so vague that judges could
lay down any rule they thought expedient.P Sir
Walter Scott thought it not a matter of surprise
that few rules existed about necessity because,
"necessity creates the law; it supersedes rules;
and whatever is reasonable and just in such cir-
cumstances is likewise legal." 24 Nevertheless, as
Hall notes, the concept of necessity has been
"anciently woven into the fabric of our culture." 2
The English courts stated the principle of neces-
an excuse where the danger, or apparent danger to
be avoided was less serious in nature.
19 Supra note 3.
20 Compare Williams, Defense of Necessity, 6 CRm. L.
REv. 216 (1953); WiILrams, CR=NAL LAW §§ 229-
41, supra note 5 (approved by the Court of Appeals
Civil Division), London Borough of Southwork v.
Williams [1971] ch. 734) with Glazebrook, The Ne-
cessity Plea in English Criminal Law, 30 CAMBmDGE
L.J. 87 (1972).21 See J. HALL, GENERAL PRcIPLs or T=E CiRm-
NAL LAw 416 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as HALL,
GmNRA PRiciPLEs].
2 Id.
23H. STEPmN, DIGEST or CRsxAr LAW, Art. 11
(9th ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as STrHm N, DiGEST].
24The Gratitudine, 3 C.Rob. 266, 165 Eng. Rep. 459
(In. 1801).25 Supra note 21.
sity as early as 1551 in Reninger v. Fagossa:26 "A
man may break the words of the law, and yet not
break the law itself... where the words of them
are broken to avoid greater inconvenience, or
through necessity, or by compulsion." 27 The case
cites the New Testament example of eating sacred
bread through necessity of hunger or taking an-
other's corn.M Older English cases contain many
examples which recognize the general principle of
necessity. 9 It was a defense to breaking a law that
the person committed the act to save a life or put
out a fire. 0 jurors could depart without the per-
mission of the judge in case of emergency." Prison-
ers might escape from a burning jail without
committing a crime.n A person did not commit the
misdemeanor of exposing an infected person in
public if the person was being carried through the
streets to a doctor. 3 The courts recognized as a
defense the failure to repair a road that water had
washed the road and all material from which the
road could be made.N
Modem English cases also recognize the defense.
In 1939 the King's Bench held that the necessity
26 [1551] 1 Plowd. 1, 75 Eng. Rep. 1.
2 Id. at 19, 75 Eng. Rep. at 29-30.
MMathew 12:3-4.29 See, e.g., Garland v. Carlisle, 2 C&M 77, 149 Eng.
Rep. 681 (Ex. 1837); per curiam, Manby v. Scott, 1
Levinz 4, 83 Eng. Rep. 268 (K.B. 1672); Hobart, Colt
v. Coventry, Hob. 300, 80 Eng. Rep. 307 (K.B. 1612);
Moore v. Hussey, Hob. 227, 80 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B.
1609); Coke, Mouse's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 63, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1341 (K.B. 1608). See also 1 BmRuToN 113 (Nichols
ed. 1865); 1 THmoPE, ANcIENT LAWS AND INsTrruTEs
oF ENGLAND, § 13, 47-49 (1840); 4 BLACeSTONE, CoMs-
MENTARIES 186.
20 Cope v. Sharpe, [1912 1 K.B. 496; Regina v.
Tolson, [1899] 23 Q.B. 172; Governor, etc. of Cast Plate
Manufacturers v. Meredith, 4 T.R. 794, 100 Eng. Rep.
1306 (K.B. 1792).
21 [14991 Y.B. T. 14 H.7 296, p. 4.12Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921); Ren-
ninger v. Fagossa, 1 Plowd. 1, 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B.
1551); Y.B. T.15 H.7 2a, p1. 2.1 Vantandillo, 4 M&S 73, 105 Eng. Rep. 762 (K.B.
1815).
3 Regina v. Bambler, 5 Q.B. 278, 286, 104 Eng. Rep.
1254, 1257. (Q.B. 1843). This case actually raises the
defense of physical necessity or impossibility rather
than the defense of justification, where the actor has a
choice. See Chesapeake & O.R.R. v. Commonwealth,
119 Ky. 519, 84 S.W. 566 (1905); Commonwealth v.
Brooks, 99 Mass. 434 (1868) (parking for a prohibited
time is excused by a traffic jam). But see Common-
wealth v. N.Y. Cent., & H.R.R., 202 Mass. 394, 88
N.E. 764 (1909) (keeping a train at a crossing more than
five minutes not excused by physical necessity). The
defense of physical necessity may be asserted where the
agent is human as where A takes B's hand and shoots
C with the weapon in C's hand. Cf. Sauers v. Sack 34
Ga. App. 148, 131 S.E. 98 (1925); HALL, GENERAL
PRrNciPIEs, supra note 21, at 433.
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of saving a mother's life was a defense to abor-
tion.35 It is a defense to obscenity that the publica-
tion is for the common good.36 Medical personnel
may use narcotics to kill pain, even, though they
hasten the death of the patient, because the value
of saving the patient from pain is preferable to the
value of postponing death.n
Early federal cases also recognize the defense. In
The William Grey,n a federal circuit court held
that necessity excused the violation of an embargo
act by entry into a forbidden port, even though the
entry was not caused by mechanical forces. In
United States v. Ashton39 sailors charged with
mutiny justified their refusal to obey the captain's
orders on the grounds that the ship was not sea-
worthy. The court held that if the ship were un-
seaworthy the conduct was not criminal. In an-
other case a long delay in reaching port because of
foul weather justified withholding food from the
crew of a ship in violation of a statute.40 The mili-
tary may seize property in case of necessity,4' and,
in Korematsu v. United States,a the Supreme Court
held that all persons of Japanese descent could be
excluded from their homes and communities by
military fiat because "the power to protect must
be commensurate with the threatened danger." 4
There is dicta that necessity will excuse high trea-
son, parricide, murder, or any other of the higher
crimes.4
A number of state cases hold that whenever it is
31Rex v. Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 686. See generally
G. WiLmAms, TnE SAmcrsrv oF Lzr, ch. 5 (1958);
Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2 MoD. L.
REv. 126 (1938).
36 Colder and Boyars Ltd., [1969] 1 Q.B. 151; Hichlin,
[1868] 3 Q.B. 360; DeMontalk, [1932] 23 Cr. App. 182;
STEPHEN, DIGEST, supra note 23, at 133.
37 Adams (1957), unreported, cited in G. W.Amu~s,
CRm4NtA LAW, supra note 5, at 726.
"29 F. Cas. 1300 (No. 17,694) (C.C.C.D. N.Y. 1810).
See also The Diana, 74 U.S. 354 (1864); The Struggle,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 71 (1815).
19 24 F. Cas. 873 (No. 14,470) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
Accord United States v. Bordon, 24 F. Cas. 1202 (No.
14,625) (D.C.D. Mass. 1857); United States v. Nye, 27
F. Cas. 210 (No. 15,906) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855); United
States v. Staley, 27 F. Cas. 1290 (No. 16,374) (C.C.D.
R.I. 1846).
40 United States v. Reed, 86 F. 308 (C.C.S.D. N.Y.
1897).
41 Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115
(1851).
42Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
4
3 Id. at 220. But see Ex parte Mulligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866) (necessity does not justify trying a
civilian before a military court because the evil could
be avoided by obeying the law and trying him according
to the common law).
44United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873 (No.
14,470) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
necessary, or reasonably appears necessary, a per-
son may destroy property to prevent the spread
of fire45 or disease.46 Speeding may be justified to
avoid ambush and unlawful arrest.47 Selling alcohol
without a prescription is justified in an emer-
gency s and a sick child may be withdrawn from
school without permission if the parent is acting
to save the child's health.
49
Perhaps the fullest discussion of the doctrine
of necessity is found in the Arizona case State v.
Wooton,'0 better known as the Bisbee Deportation
case. On April 26, 1917, the Industrial Workers of
the World (I.W.W.) called a strike of the copper
miners in the Warran District of Cochise County,
Arizona. On July 12, the sheriff, with the help of
a posse of more than 1,000 men, rounded up 1100
to 1200 of the strikers and their sympathizers, in-
cluding practically every member of the I.W.W.
in the area. The local authorities put the captives
aboard a special freight train and transported
4" See, e.g., Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853): Crom-
well v. Emrie, 2 Ind. 35 (1850); Field v. City of Des
Moines, 39 Ia. 575 (1874); Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L.
714 (N.J. 1848), aff'd sub. nor. American Print Works
v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590 (Ct. of Errors and Appeals,
1851); Keller v. City of Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614
(1879). See generally Beale, Justification for Injury, 41
H~Av. L. REv. 553 (1923).
4 6 Seavy v. Preble, 64 Me. 120 (1874).
47 Browning v. State, 244 Ala. 251, 257, 13 S.2d 51,
56 (1943); But cf. Buckoke v. G.L.C. [1971] ch. 662,
cited in Glazebrook, The Necessity Plea in English
Criminal Law, 30 CAmRimGE L.J. 87, 96, n.32 (1972)
(Court of Appeal (Civil Division) accepted the sub-
missions of both counsel that the driver of a fire engine
would commit an offense by running a stoplight, even
though there was no risk to other vehicles and crossing
the lights would appreciably increase the chance of
saving life and property); Butterfield v. Texas, 317
S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Crim. 1958) (drunk driving not ex-
cused because one is seriously injured and has no other
way of getting to the hospital); R. v. Kiston, [1955] 39
Crim. App. 66 (drunk driving not excused by waking up
next to the driver and finding the car in motion).
48 State v. Wray, 72 N.E. 253 (1885); Commonwealth
v. Patterson, 16 Wly. Notes Cas. 193 (Pa. 1885).
49 State v. Johnson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902).
1 Crim. No. 2685 (Cochise Cty, Ariz. Sept. 13, 1919).
The case is unreported as a consequence of a verdict of
acquittal. The basic facts of the case, however, and the
ruling of the trial judge, Samuel L. Pattee, on the de-
fendant's offer of proof are reproduced in Comment,
The Law of Necessity as Applied in the Bisbee Deporta-
tion Case, 3 A=z. L. REv. 264 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as 3 Aroz. L. REv.] and 6 A.B.A.J. 99 (1920). See gen-
erally The Trial of Harry E. Wooton for Kidnapping,
Tombstone, Arizona 1920, 17 ARi.scA TRIA S 1; U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, REPORT ON THE BISBEE DEPORTA-
TIONS (1918); The Law of Necessity as Applied in the
State of Arizona v. H. R. Wooton (Tucson: Bureau of
Information, undated); Note, Necessity As a Defense,
21 CoLuss. L. REv. 71 (1921) (critical of the case be-
cause the jury was not instructed that a less evil alterna-
tive had to be chosen if it was available).
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them under guard to Hermanos, New Mexico,
where they left the captives with federal troops.
Neither the federal nor the state governments
declared martial law in the district and the sheriff
and his posse did not claim to be acting as mili-
tary. No one in authority took the arrestees before
a magistrate as then required by state law. Even-
tually the State charged some 200 possemen with
kidnapping, and one, H. E. Wooton, was brought
to trial.
At the dose of the state's case, the defendant
asserted the defense of necessity. He offered to
prove that the I.W.W. had been an organized
anarchistic conspiracy to overthrow the govern-
ment and the capitalistic system, that the con-
spirators were present in the Warran District in
great numbers to destroy the lives and property of
its inhabitants, and that as prudent men the de-
fendant and his associates reasonably believed the
deportation imminently necessary for the preserva-
tion of life and property in the district." The de-
fendant contended that proof of these facts should
be admitted on the theories of self-defense and of
necessity. The court said that self-defense could
not lie, but that Wooton could assert the defense
of necessity.52
Judge Pattee distinguished self-defense as jus-
tifying the repulse of a wrong and necessity as
justifying the invasion of a right.53 The latter de-
fense, he said, springs not from the sovereign
power, the civil government, the social compact,
or any right of property, but from a natural right
that appertains to the individual.5 He wrote:
51The defendant also offered to prove that the
strikes were designed to obstruct the war effort, that
the co-conspirators had assaulted and threatened
citizens, that the leader of the co-conspirators had told
the sheriff he would no longer be responsible for the
acts of his men, that the sheriff reasonably believed
the co-conspirators intended to commit many felonies
in the district, and that federal troops had been'sought
without avail.
6 3 Amz. L. REv., supra note 50, at 264-265. Self-
defense is a species of necessity. See Oliver v. State, 18
Ala. 587 (1850); HALL, GENFRAL PRINCIPIES, supra
note 21, at 434:
Technically, the privilege of self defense implies
that there is a human assailant, one who is bound
by a legal duty. In the exercise of the privilege of
necessity, on the other hand, there is no violation
of the actor's legal right. In self defense, the de-
fender injures the creator and embodiment of the
evil situation; in necessity, he harms a person who
was in no way responsible for the imminent danger,
one who, indeed, might himself have been imperiled
by it.
5 3 Asuz. L. Rxv., supra note 50, at 266-67.
54 'd.
Tihe rule seems to be settled that whenever it is
necessary or reasonably appears to be necessary
that property be destroyed ... the right of destruc-
tion arising from necessity exempts those com-
mitting the destruction from the liabilities that
would ordinarily obtain in the case of the invasion
of one's property right by another.5
Judge Pattee also held that the principle applied
to personality as well as to real estate, to life as
to property.5 6 One seeking to justify what would
otherwise be an unlawful act on the basis of neces-
sity had the burden of proving that the necessity
existed, and of showing that the anticipated peril
sought to be averted was not disproportionate to
the wrongY Relying especially on Conmmnwealtk
v. Blodgett,ss Judge Pattee said the weight and
sufficiency of evidence tending to establish neces-
sity are for the jury, and the court may pass on
that issue as a matter of law only where evidence
is wholly wanting or where the state of facts could
not in any way warrant the interposition of the
plea.
69
The court ruled that under the circumstances
presented in the offer of proof, the jury should
determine the question of the existence of the
state of necessity as a question of fact.6 0 At the
conclusion of the trial, the case was submitted to
the jury which deliberated fifteen minutes and
r, 5 Id.
66 Id.
5R Id. at 268.
68 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 56 (1846). This case involved a
prosecution arising out of a controversy in Rhode
Island in 1842 known as Dorr's rebellion. The de-
fendant, a member of the regular militia of Rhode
Island, allegedly kidnapped four followers of Dorr who
had fled to Massachusetts. The defendant was tried
and convicted in Massachusetts of kidnapping. The
judge instructed the jury that:
[Sluch capture of the troops of Rhode Island, was
unlawful, unless necessary in defense of the lives
and property of the citizens of Rhode Island, or in
defense of the state, at the time; of which necessity,
or probable cause of necessity, the jury and not the
State of Rhode Island, was the proper judge.
Id. at 71.
In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts through Chief Justice Shaw approved
the instruction given by the trial court. It noted that it
was difficult to see how the act could be considered done
in the necessary defense of the territory of Rhode Island,
but said the question was rightly submitted to the jury,
as one of "strictly necessary defense." Id. at 85. How-
ever, the holding implies only that it was more proper
for the jury to decide the question of necessity than for
the State of Rhode Island to determine it in advance.
59 3 ARIz. L. REv., supra note 50, at 273, 276.
G Id. at 277.
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returned a verdict of "Not Guilty" on the first
ballot.61
The cases and the literature suggest three essen-
tial elements of the defense of necessity: (1) the
act charged was done to avoid a significant evil;
(2) there was no other adequate means of escape;
and (3) the remedy was not disproportionate to
the evil to be avoided. Not just actual peril, but a
well founded belief in impending peril is sufficient
to raise the defense." The question of burden of
proof is not dear. Some cases place the burden on
the defendant not only to raise but to carry the
issue."
These generalizations are substantiated by the
cases where the defense has failed: that liquor is
used as a heart medicine does not justify having
it near a church because one could stay home or
get another medicine.6' Economic necessity is no
defense to stealing because the state provides
another alternative through welfare. 5 Bad con-
ditions do not justify escape from prison because
there is the alternative of proceeding through
proper channels.6" Time of war does not justify
61 Id. at 279.
"Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 358
(D.C. Cir. 1938); United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas.
873, 874 (No. 14,470) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834). (The jury
should be instructed to find the defendants not guilty of
meeting "if they acted bona fide upon reasonable
grounds of belief, that the ship was unseaworthy, and
if the jury, from all the circumstances, are doubtful,
whether the ship was seaworthy.... "); Hall v. State,
136 Fla. 644, 187S. 392 (1939)(It was error to instruct
the jury that actual peril must exist; well-founded be-
lief in the impending peril is sufficient to raise the
defense).
3State v. Wooton, Crim. No. 2685 (Cochise Cty.,
Ariz. Sept. 13, 1919). The embargo cases also generally
put the burden of proof on the defendant. See cases
cited supra note 38. See also Ensign v. United States,
291 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1961) (not plain error to
place the burdern of proof on the defense). But see
Commonwealth v. Refitt, 149 Ky. 300, 148 S.W. 48,
(1912). Regina v. Gill, [1963] 2 All E. R. 688 (Crim.
App.) (burden is on prosecution once the issue is raised).
" Bice v. State, 109 Ga. 117, 34 S.E. 202 (1899).
66 State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638 (1933)
(Unemployed persons took flour and groceries from a
Red Cross Commissary. The case, however, does not
raise the question of starvation or even of hunger.) See
also United States v. Ramzy 446 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (191) (economic coercion not
available as a defense where the statute does not re-
quire specific intent).
66 People v. Richard, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 597 (1969); People v. Whipple, 100 Cal App.
261, 279 P. 1081 (1929); People v. Noble, 18 Mich.
App. 300, 170 N.E.2d 916 (1969); State v. Green, 470
S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971). United States v. Chapman, 455
F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1972) (duress may be a defense to
escape but prisoners have a duty to return); People v.
Wester, 237 Cal. App. 2d 232, 46 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1965).
trying a civilian before a military tribunal because
he could be tried in accordance with law at a later
time." In a prosecution for the destruction of in-
toxicating liquors, it is not a defense that such
intoxicants constitute a public nuisance because
official agencies exist for dealing with public
nuisances.Y
In a plea of necessity, the defendant admits per-
forming the act charged and admits the act tech-
nically violated a law. The defendant contends
that the conduct was justified because it was the
only feasible way to avoid a greater evil and that
it would be unjust to apply the law in the particu-
lar case.
Pleas of necessity, then, involve two determina-
tions. The first is a factual determination: did the
situation as alleged by the defendant actually
exist (was the ship actually in danger) and did the
defendant have any legal way out (could a friendly
port have been made safely). The second is a
determination of values: whether the alternative
chosen was, in itself, the lesser evil.
In most necessity cases, the question of which
evil is the lesser is really not in dispute. No one in
our society seriously debates whether property
may be destroyed to save human life or whether
an embargo act may be violated to keep a ship
from sinking.6 Property is of less value than hu-
man life. Thus the only question to be decided is
the fact question: was the situation as extreme as
the defendant alleged.
Two famous cases, however, United States v.
Hohnes ° and Regina v. Dudley and Stephens,'
present the problem of necessity more precisely.
In those cases the value choice of the defendants
as well as the facts of the case were in dispute.
In Holmes, after the shipwreck of the William
Brown, members of the crew threw fourteen pas-
People v. Cooper, Crim. No. 38602, Sacramento, Cali-
fornia, Aug. 9, 1971, cited in Comment, Escape the
Defenses of Duress and Necessity, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 430,
438 (1972).
"Ex parle Mulligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
18 Nation v. District of Columbia, 34 App. D.C. 453,
455, 26 L.R.A. 996, 997-98 (1910).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873
(No. 14,470) (C.C.D. Mass. 180).
70 26 F. Cas. 36 (No. 15,383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
For background see THE TRIAL OF WinA= Houm~s
ET AL. ON AN INDIcTMENT TOR MURDER ON THE HIGH
SEAS (1920).
7' 15 Cox C.C. 624, 117 Eng. Rep. 101 (Q.B. 1844).
For background see J. SmTr-HuGns, UNFAm Cot-
MENT ON SoME VlcromAN MURDER TIALs (1951);
Cross, Necessity Knows No Law, 3 U. oF TASmAmA L.




sengers overboard to lighten a lifeboat that was
sinking. The federal government tried one of the
crew for manslaughter and the principal defense
was necessity. After counsel for both sides had
argued the law and the evidence, Judge Baldwin
instructed the jury that giving a favorable inter-
pretation to evidence in order to mitigate an offense
is different from justifying the act. Feelings of
compassion may influence the jury's decision re-
garding mitigation, but only the law of necessity
can "disarm the vindicatory justice of the coun-
try." 2 When a case does arise in which necessity
is a valid defense, "the penal laws pass over such
case in silence: for the law is made to meet but the
ordinary exigencies of life." 7 3
But judge Baldwin carefully limited the defense
stating that "the case does not become 'a case of
necessity' unless all ordinary means of self-preser-
vation have been exhausted. The peril must be
instant, overwhelming, leaving no alternative but
to lose our own life, or to take the life of another
person." 7 14 judge Baldwin first illustrated the
point with the case of self defense against an attack
aiming to destroy life or to inflict grievous injury.
He also discussed "the taking of life under other
circumstances where the act is indispensably req-
uisite to self-existence." 7J judge Baldwin noted
that a person is not bound to save another's life
by sacrificing his or her own life, and the person
would commit no crime in saving his or her own
life in a struggle for the only means of safety in a
situation where both cannot survive. He concluded
by stating that "when this great 'law of necessity'
does apply, and is not improperly exercised, the
taking of life is divested of unlawfulness." 7
The judge also instructed the jury, however,
that passengers must be favored over seamen who
are not necessary to run the boat, and that those
to be thrown overboard must be determined by
lot.Y There was evidence that only passengers had
been thrown out and that their selection had been
arbitrary. The jury, after deliberating sixteen
hours, returned a verdict of guilty, and the de-
fendant was sentenced to six months imprison-
ment in solitary confinement at hard labor, and
lined twenty dollars.
In Regina v. Dudley and Steplens7s three men







78 15 Cox C.C. 624, 117 Eng. Rep. 101 (Q.B. 1844).
and the cabin boy escaped in an open boat from
the shipwreck of the Mignonette. On the twentieth
day having been eighteen days without food, the
men killed the boy and fed on his flesh. Four days
later another ship rescued the three men. Upon
their arrival to England, two of the men were
tried for murder and convicted. The two men
raised the issue of necessity on the appeal. Lord
Coleridge, although taking cognizance of Holmes,
refused to recognize any principle of law which
entitled a person to take the life of an innocent
person to save his own.79 The defendants even-
tually served a six month sentence80
The two cases raise many questions. Commenta-
tors have suggested that the defense based on the
principle it is better for some to live than for all
to die, is valid in both England and America, but
that the question is confused in England because
of the element of cannibalism in Dudley.n1 But
Cardozo supported the English decision stating,
"Who shall know when masts and sails of rescue
may emerge out of the fog." 82 Even if it is better
that some live than that all die, is self preference
proper? 81 And if self preference is improper, should
the law punish where punishment cannot prevent
infractions of the law because the threat of punish-
ment at a future time is not sufficient to overcome
the fear of present peril? 8 If, however, self pref-
erence is proper, but not when there is a duty
owed as between crew and passengers, is it good
to lay down a rule that might result in sailors
throwing all the passengers overboard so there will
not be witnesses?
The questions raised by Holmes and Dudley
show that the defense of necessity, at base, re-
quires a choice of values. As Williams put it:
"[Ajlthough the defense of necessity is subjective
as to its facts, it is objective as to values ... [and]
involves deciding whether, on a social view, the
value asserted was greater than the value de-
7 117 Eng. Rep. 111. Accord, R. v. Ross, [1854 1
New So. W.S.C.R. App. 43.80 Originally they were sentenced to death. The
Crown commuted the sentence.
81 See CAHN, TnE MoRAL. DEcIsION 71 (1956);
Fuller, The Speluncean Explorers, 62 HAuv. L. Rlv.
616 (1949); Stallybrass, Principles of Criminal Law
in England, 14 J. Comnp. LEG. & INT'L. L. 233, 237
(1932).
82B. CaPanozo, LAW Am LnTErTmm 113 (1931).
83justice Holmes would seem to allow the taking of
an innocent life to save one's own. 0. HoIms, TIE
CommoN LAW 40 (1881).
" See Hitchler, supra note 14; WiLnniS § 238, supra
note 5 (for the proposition that punishment should not
be imposed where it is likely to be a useless deterrent).
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nied." 85 That the decisions in Holmes and Dudley
should come out on opposite sides of the question
whether one innocent life can be sacrificed to save
two, illustrates how difficult the "value asserted"
question can be.
III. The Jury and Nullification
Assuming a necessity plea where the question
of values is in dispute, the problem becomes a
question of who is to decide the lesser evil issue.
In practice, of course, the judge decides whether
or not the defense may present evidence and argue
to the jury that the defendant broke a law because
in the circumstances the law conflicted with a
higher value in a particular set of circumstances.
The real issue is whether in certain cases a judge
should instruct the jury that they have the power
to decide the question of competing values.
The Model Penal Code recognized that any
formulation of the defense of necessity will be
imprecise because there are disagreements over
what constitutes an evil and over which of two
evils is greater, and because "deep disagreements
are bound to exist over some moral issues, such as
the extent to which values are absolute or relative
and how far desirable ends may justify otherwise
offensive means .... 88 However, the Code does
not indicate how far the issue should be determined
by the court as one of law or, in the alternative,
submitted to the jury.
Theoretically, submitting the value issue to the
jury would be in keeping with the concept of trial
by jury. Where activity falls within the "penum-
bra" of the law or where disagreement exists in a
society about a moral issue or the extent to which
a value is absolute (admitting of no exception) or
relative, there seems to be little reason why a
defendant should not be allowed in the first in-
stance to have the jury as the "conscience of the
community" and his peers decide whether he
made an objectively correct choice of values. If
the jury decides in the defendant's favor, he is
vindicated. If the jury votes to convict, the de-
fendant still has a right to appeal their decision.
When a defendant raises a good faith defense of
necessity, that is, when he makes a non-frivolous
claim that his otherwise criminal act was done to
preserve some higher value, the jury as the repre-
81 WLAims § 239, supra note 5.
86 MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment (Tent. Draft 8,
1958) at 9.
8 Id. at 6.
sentative of the community should be allowed to
decide the issue of relative values. In determining
whether or not to allow a defendant to raise the
defense of necessity, a trial judge should only de-
cide whether or not the question of values pre-
sented by the defendant is frivolous. If the' values
asserted by the defendant are so bizarre as to be
dearly unacceptable to any significant portion of
the community, the defense should not be allowed.
In the United States, for example, a defendant
should not be allowed to raise as a defense to homo-
cide the necessity of saving a cow. But where the
value question is not dear, the jury should be
allowed to decide not only if the facts alleged by
the defendant were as extreme as the defendant
said they were, but if they were, whether the de-
fendant made the correct choice.
Permitting the jury to decide the value issue in
a necessity plea is, in a certain sense, permitting
the jury to decide a question of law. In the United
States, it is almost a blackletter principle that
juries decide questions of fact and judges questions
of law.88 At the same time, it is common practice
to allow juries to decide "mixed questions of fact
and law" such as questions of negligence, reason-
able man, reasonable doubt and obscenity. 89
Speaking to the jury's function in deciding the
question of criminal responsibility, Judge Bazelon
recently observed:
In deciding whether a defendant in a negligence
case owed a duty of care to the plantiff, the real
question is whether by prevailing community
standards the defendant was at fault, and whether
the law should hold him responsible for the con-
sequences of his conduct."8
The issue presented to the jury in a necessity
plea, however, is different from other areas where
juries decide interrelated questions of law and
fact since in the case of necessity the jury is asked
to decide whether the value asserted justified vio-
lating a dear precept of the law. This is very
similar to instructing the jury that it may nullify
the law.
8 See Sparf and Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S.
51, 102 (1895). This is also the rule in all the states
except Maryland and Indiana. See United States v.
Moylan, 417 F.2d 1007, n.17 (4th Cir. 1969).
89 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
(obscenity to be determined by local community stand-
ard).
90 United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 625 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C. J., concurring). See also United




The doctrine of jury nullification holds that
jurors have the right to set aside the instructions
of the judge and to reach a verdict of acquittal
based on their own consciences and that the de-
fendant has the right to have the jury so instructed.
This doctrine has a venerable history in Anglo-
American jurisprudence. 9' Bushel's Case92 in 1670
established the right of jurors to reach a verdict
without force or pressure. The court sentenced the
jury to prison for failure to find William Penn
guilty of preaching before an unlawful assembly
when he had dearly done so. The Court of Common
Pleas released the jurors and stopped the practice
of punishing jurors for their verdicts. Chief Justice
Vaughn wrote that the jury resolves both law and
fact.
93
In 1783 in the Dean of St. Asaph's Case94 Thomas
Erskine convinced the jury to disregard the court's
instruction in a prosecution for seditious libel to
which truth was no defense. The judge had in-
structed the jury they could not consider justifica-
tion but could only decide the fact of publication,
which was not in dispute. Similarly, a New York
jury in 1735 acquitted John Peter Zenger after his
counsel argued to the jury that it had the right to
determine both the law and the facts where Zenger
was being prosecuted for publishing material not
authorized by the British Mayor.95
In 1794 Chief Justice John Jay in a civil trial
held under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court instructed the jury, "You have, neverthe-
less, a right ... to determine the law as well as
the facts in controversy." 91 As late as 1800, Jus-
tice Chase, in his own impeachment trial, was
accused, among other things, of usurping the func-
tion of the jury by denying them the right to de-
cide the law in a prosecution for treason.Y Justice
Chase appended to his answer the charge that he
had given instructing the jury that in criminal
cases they were the judges of both law and fact.
Justice Story in 1835 first questioned the jurys'
91 See generally Sax, Rex v. Dean of St. Asaph's,
Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Re-
sisters, 57 YAr REv. 481 (1968); Scheflin, Jury Nullifica-
tion: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL.. L. REv. 168 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Scheflin, Jury Nullsigcationl; Note,
The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century,
74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964).
12 6 HowEuL, STATE TRrALs 999.31d. at 1015-16.
9121 HowELL, STATE TRIALs 847.
95 See J. ALExANDER, A BRuEP NARRATION or rH
CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 99 (1963).
06 Georgia v. Bradsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
0 See generally Liicb, The Chase Impeachment, 4
AmER. J. LEGAL HisT. 49 (1960).
right to decide issues of law in United States v.
Battiste.99 In that case, the trial judge, apparently
fearing a jury would be too harsh on a sailor ac-
cused of transporting slaves, refused to let the jury
decide an issue of law. Chief Justice Shaw followed
in 1845 in Commonwealth v. Porter99 by holding
that a jury could not determine questions of law.
Judge Curtis in United States v. Morris"'° argued
that allowing the jury to decide the law in disregard
of statute and precedent would result in the demise
of law. Finally, in 1895, the United States Supreme
Court in Sparf and Hanson v. United States'0'
eliminated the principle of jury nullification, de-
daring: 'Public and private safety alike would be
in peril, if the principle be established that juries
in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law
as expounded to them by the court and become a
law unto themselves." 1
0 2
The defendants in three recent cases 03 involving
destruction of Selective Service files to protest the
war in Southeast Asia argued on appeal that their
proposed jury nullification instructions had been
improperly refused since they had a right to in-
form the jurors of their "power to bring in a verdict
in the teeth of both law and facts." 104 The courts,
with varying amounts of discussion, reiterated the
rule of Sparf and Hanson, saying that defendants
have no right to have juries instructed that juries
can disobey the law with impunity °5
Although the plea of necessity is similar to the
concept of jury nullification, the two differ in one
important respect. Under the jury nullification
concept the court instructs the jury that they have
the authority to acquit the defendant if, on the
basis of conscience, they do not believe he should
be convicted, even though the judge's instructions
leave no alternative but conviction. A necessity
instruction is much more narrow; the court in-
structs the jury that it can acquit only if the act
charged was necessary to avoid a greater injury
and if the defendant had no other adequate means
of escape. The necessity instruction is thus limited
1S 24 F. Cas. 1042 (No. 14,545) (C.C.D. Mass. 1835).
99 10 Met. 263 (Mass. 1845).
'00 26 F. Cas. 1323 (No. 15,815) (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
101156 U.S. 51 (1895).
1
0
2 Id. at 101-02.
'10 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515
(9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
10 Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135,
138 (1920).




to cases where the trial court recognizes a question
-of competing values. Moreover, the jury is not
told that it has the authority to decide the law in
general, but only that it may decide that in a par-
ticular set of circumstances a defendant was justi-
fied in breaking the law to safeguard a higher
value.
IV. Prosecutorial Discretion
Like jury nullification, however, necessity must
be viewed as an exercise in discretion 0 6 Discretion
in criminal cases is most often exercised at the
level of the cop on the beat. 7 Of the cases actually
initiated, prosecutorial discretion in ordinary
cases is a very effective means of assuring that
justice will prevail over law.j1 When the values of
a community at a particular time are at variance
with the values of the community as reflected in a
law written at an earlier time, or when a commun-
ity considers a technical violation of the law ex-
cused by the particular circumstances surrounding
the act, the technical violation is usually over-
looked. The imperfection of the law's reflection of
the values of the community is righted by a simple
check: prosecutorial discretion. For example, one
commentator notes that under a since repealed
Illinois statute making possession of even a small
amount of marijuana a felony, many cases simply
were not prosecuted. 0 9 The United States Supreme
Court decided in Poe v. Ulltnann °O that an unen-
forced Connecticut anti-contraceptive law could
not be the basis of a controversy and dismissed an
action for declaratory judgment, saying that a
strict policy of not carrying out a law was truer
law than the dead words of the written text.
Clearly, the government rarely brings cases where
the values of a community would excuse a tech-
nical infraction of the law because of the particular
surrounding circumstances: it may be assumed
prosecutors do not often bring charges of breaking
and entering against one who tried to save a baby
from a burning building.
Prosecutorial discretion, however, becomes a
poor check in certain circumstances, especially
when the government is prosecuting a defendant
106 See generally K. L. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY Jus-
TicE (1969).
107 See generally I. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE Wrmouz
TIAL (1966).
"0' See generally F. MILLER, PROSECUTION (American
:Bar Foundation, 1969).
109 See Fahey, The Enforcement of the Illinois Felony
Marijuana Law in Chicago, WASH. U.L.Q. 281 (1970).
110 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
for political reasons."' In such cases, the techni-
calities of the law are used to harass political per-
sons for conduct the community might not con-
sider criminal. There is a suspicion today that the
federal government is prosecuting certain cases
which would not be brought but for political
motives." 2 For example, it appears that the federal
government has never prosecuted anyone for
smuggling letters in and out of prison until it
recently prosecuted two anti-war activists.- 3 The
technicalities of the law of conspiracy are often
used against political dissidents in an attempt to
silence their vocal opposition to administration
policies." 4
Prosecutors and commentators have long recog-
nized the great discretion of the prosecutor to
decide who shall be charged with a crime. In 1940
Justice Robert Jackson, then Attorney General,
warned that:
The prosecutor has more control over life, lib-
erty, and reputation than any other person in
America .... While the prosecutor at his best is
one of the most beneficient forces in our society,
when he acts from malice or other base motives, he
is one of the worstu n
In his book Discretionary Justice,n 6 Professor
Davis confirms Justice Jackson's appraisal:
'It is difficult to define the terms "political trial"
or "political defendant." Professor Jon R. Waltz sug-
gests that there are at least six indicia: (1) where the
defendants are "political persons" dissenting from
current dogma or the conventional wisdom; (2) where
the statute that is the source of the charge was enacted
for the very purpose of combatting persons like the
defendants who oppose particular administration
policies; (3) where the defendants are being prosecuted
partly for what they think and say; (4) where there is
selective prosecution; (5) where it is necessary to rely
on undercover agents and provocateurs; (6) where the
trial is not a model of evenhandedness and judicial
restraint. Waltz, Tensions Between Political Defend-
ants and the Courts, Oct. 15, 1971 (unpublished lecture,
DePaul College Speakers Program).
The various meanings of the term political trial, in-
dude: (1) trials which will have political repercussions;
(2) prosecutions for technical crimes when the motive
is to suppress political activity; (3) a fabricated case
brought to silence a political person; (4) trials for politi-
cal offenses. Scheflin, Jury Ndlification, supra note 91,
at 191, n. 85. See T. BEcKER, PorCrCAL TRaAs (1971);
0. KimcHEEmER, PorIcAL JusTIcE: TnE UsE oF
LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR PorITIcAL ENDs (1961); J.
SHsLAR, LEGALism (1964).
1 See Gilmare, The Twilight Period, 17 U. CHi. L.
Scn. REc. 15 (1970); T. Allen, Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lecture, (Harvard, March 15, 1973).
n3 Chicago Sun Times, April 6, 1972, at 8, col. 2.
1 See J. MrroRn, Tna TaRA, oF DR. Srocn (1969).
115 Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRW.
L.C. & P.S. 3 (1940).
n ]K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JusTIcE (1969).
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DEFENSE OF NECESSIRY
Viewed in broad prospective, the American
legal system seems to be shot through with many
excessive and uncontrolled discretionary powers
but the one that stands out above all others is the
power to prosecute.u7
In United States v. FalkI the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit extended the use of the
equal protection clause for defendants who claim
that the government discriminated against them
when they were selectively prosecuted. Under the
standard established in Falk, if a defendant raises
a reasonable doubt as to whether there was im-
proper discrimination in the prosecution, then the
burden of going forward with proof shifts to the
government to demonstrate that its motives were
proper.u9 However, as one writer has already
noted, 2 ' this approach will not help many de-
fendants since it will be hard to raise even a reason-
able doubt that they have been victims of inten-
tional discrimination. Few defendants will be in a
position to argue that their selection was improper.
Of those defendants who can so argue, fewer still
will be able to prove that the motives of the pros-
ecutor were eviL
In those cases where law and justice do not
coincide, and where prosecutorial discretion is not
likely to be employed, the best chance for justice
lies with the discretion of the jury. This function
of the jury was expressed recently in United States
v. Dougherty.'2 Although rejecting the defendants'
contention that they had a right to a jury nullifi-
cation instruction, Judge Leventhal wrote:
Human frailty being what it is, a prosecutor
disposed by unworthy motives could likely estab-
lish some basis in fact for bringing charges against
anyone he wants to book, but the jury system
operates in fact... so that the jury will not convict
when they empathize with the defendant, as when
the offence is one they see themselves likely to
commit, or consider generally acceptable or con-
donable under the mores of the community."'
Assuming that jury nullification is a passe con-
cept in American jurisprudence, the defense of
necessity is a "safety valve," fully within our legal
tradition, whereby juries may be informed of their
1t Id. at 188.
I1s 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
19 Id. at 624.
=Comment, The Ramifications of United States v.
Falk on Equal Protection from Prosecutorial Discretion,
65 J. Cm. L. & C. 62, 70-74 (1974).
473 F.2d 1113 (D. C. Cir. 1972).
mfd. at 1132.
discretionary function as the conscience of the
community. A necessity instruction would be pref-
erable to a jury nullification instruction because
the nullification instruction, in essence, presents
the jury with the disturbing anomaly of being told
the law is that they may disregard the law. This
is, at best, a confusing concept.2 3 A necessity in-
struction on the other hand, tells the jury they
may acquit the defendant if they find that given
all the circumstances the defendant reasonably
believed the results of breaking the law would be
a lesser evil than the result of keeping the law.
The defendant in a recent "political case,"
United States v. Simpson,"' attempted to appeal to
the conscience and discretion of the jury by raising
the defense of necessity. On Christmas Eve, 1970,
in an effort to impede the war in Southeast Asia,
Brother John Simpson entered the Local Board of
the Selective Service System in San Jose, Cali-
fornia, opened a file drawer, doused the contents
with gasoline, and set the files ablaze. Simpson
remained in the building and was arrested. He was
subsequently indicted and convicted of destroying
government property and interfering with the
Selective Service System.
On appeal Simpson assigned as error, inter alia,2 5
the trial court's refusal to allow evidence and to
give a jury instruction regarding the defense of
necessity. Simpson sought to introduce evidence
that his actions were done to avert greater evil in
the war zone. The trial judge rejected the proffered
evidence and the requested instruction, noting
the lack of authority supporting the necessity
defense in the particular context.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
citing the A.L.I. Model Penal Code, recognized in
Simpson the "theoretical basis of the justification
defense ... that, in many instances, society bene-
fits when one acts to prevent another from inten-
tionally or negligently causing injury to people or
property." 12 The court said, however, that an
essential element of the defense is a reasonable
anticipation of a direct causal relationship between
m To tell [a juror] expressly of a nullification pre-
rogative, however, is to inform him, in effect, that
it is he who fashions the rule that condemns. That
is an overwhelming responsibility, an extreme
burden for the juror's psyche.
Id. at 1136.
460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972).
125 The defendant also raised a jury nullification issue
and a willfulness argument. At base all of these issues
are the same.
2
6 460 F.2d at 518.
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the otherwise criminal act and the avoidance of
harm. The court concluded that it was unreason-
able for Simpson to assume his actions might have
a significant effect on the evils he wished to pre-
ventin because the war would obviously continue
whether or not the San Jose draft board continued
to function.m
United States v. Baranski"29 involved facts almost
identical to Simpson, except that the four de-
fendants poured blood on the records instead of
burning them. Again the defendants raised the
defense of necessity by arguing that they reason-
ably believed their conduct was necessary to save
those persons registered in the files they destroyed
from imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury and from being compelled to commit war
crimes in an illegal war. The defendants also as-
serted that they reasonably believed this action
was necessary to impede the war. The defendants
offered to prove that the Viet Nam war was illegal
under international law, that draftees were in
imminent danger of death in Viet Nam, and that
draftees were compelled to commit war crimes in
Viet Nam. They further offered to prove that the
United States intent in Viet Nam was not strong
enough to justify its participation in the war, and
that the draft and the war were unconstitutional.'
The trial judge accepted only a small portion of
this proffered testimony.
The defendants tendered a defense of necessity
jury instruction which the trial judge rejected.
Nevertheless, the jury found the defendants not
guilty of the three substantive charges alleged in
the indictment (the same charges as in Simpson)
but guilty of conspiracy. On appeal, the conspiracy
count was reversed on other grounds.13'
There have been numerous other cases involving
117 Id. Presumably Simpson offered to prove it was
reasonable for him to believe these actions would have a
significant effect. The court of appeals may have con-
cluded from the record that no reasonable jury could
make such a finding. But it is hardly clear that when
respected persons in the community destroy records to
protest a war these actions have no significant effect
on the war policy of a country. Daniel Ellsberg's re-
leasing of the PENTAGON PAPERS arguably, at least, had
a significant effect on the war.
12 460 F.2d at 518, n.7. Arguably, however, the
appellant could have saved lives and property by
merely impeding the war, or shortening it, without
ending it.
19 484 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1973).
130 For the argument that there ought to be special
rules of evidence for proving issues of this kind, see
D'Amato, Gould and Woods, War Crimes and Vietnam:
The "Nuremberg Defense" and the Military Service
Resister, 57 CAL. L. REv. 1055, 1069-97 (1969).
M 484 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1973).
the destruction of Selective Service records by
anti-war protestors who claimed to have destroyed
property in order to save livesl2 In at least two
of these cases, United States v. Chase"'l and United
States v. Cullen,14 the defendants formally at-
tempted to raise the defense of necessity. The trial
judge in each case did not permit the defense.
The judge in another case, United States v. Berri-
gan,135 added that the defense is outmoded in
modem society.
Although in the above cases the protestors
claimed they were destroying property to save
lives, they sought to convince the jury that the
symbolic destruction of property in which the
defendants engaged was justified as a protest
against an illegal war."' Such protestors often
speak of obeying a higher moral law or their con-
science." To this argument the court in United
States v. Moylan"' responded that the defendants'
motivation and sincere belief that they were break-
ing the law in a good cause is not acceptable as a
legal defense or justification. The court stated that
"[i]t implies no disparagement of their idealism to
say that society will not tolerate the means they
chose to register their opposition to the war." "I
Yet this response seems rather to beg the ques-
tion. Mere subjective good motive, as where one
acts purely on a religious belief, is no defense to a
criminal actY.4 0 Whether society will consider a
particular form of opposition to its government's
policies justified is a different question, and one
in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); United States v. Chase, 468 F.2d 141 (7th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Glick, 463 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Turchick, 451 F.2d 333
(8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Beneke, 449 F.2d 1259
(8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d
1009 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Moylan, 417
F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Berrigan,
283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1969).
1 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1972). See Trial Memoran-
dum for this case prepared by William Cunningham,
69 CR 364 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
"1 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971). See Trial Memoran-
dum for this case prepared by James Shellow, 68 CR
113 (E.D. Wisc. 1968).
I' 283 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Md. 1969).
"'See generally L. VELVEL, UNDECLARED WAR AND
CrvIL DIsoammNc 215 (1970); Dworkin, On Not
Prosecuting Civil Disobedience, NEW YoRK REviEw oF
BOOKS 14 (June 6, 1968).
131 See generally D. BERRIGAN, No BARS TO MANHOOD
(1969); D. BERRIGAx, THE TRIAL or ram CATONSVIIZX
NINE (1970); P. BERRIGAN, PRISON JouRNAIs (1970).
13 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1009. But cf. United States v. Bowen, 421
F.2d 193, 197 (4th Cir. 1970).




that can really only be answered by the jury
which acts as the spokesman for society.
Conclusion
As stated above, the Sruny DRAFT OF A NEw
FEDERAL CIMNAL CODE contained Section 608
entitled "Conduct which Avoids Greater Harm." 
4
The Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws stated in the Comments that this section
embodied the doctrine of necessity. The Commis-
sion codified the defense because "[i]t makes no
sense to punish persons who have acted to avoid
great harm, even if they have 'broken a law' to do
so." '1 The provision was to include the obvious
cases such as speeding in order to reach a hospital
in an emergency or destroying a house to stop a
forest fire. The Commission also intended that
Section 608 include extreme cases, such as killing
some persons to save a greater number?4
The final Proposed Code deleted the codified
necessity defense and added Section 601 which
simply stated, "Except as otherwise provided,
justification or excuse under this chapter is a de-
fense." " The Commissioners explained that they
did not want to "freeze the rules as they now
exist." 145 They added that Section 601 did not
include the "Choice of Evils" rule (that emergency
measures to avoid greater injury may be justified)
because "even the best statutory formulations
... is a potential source of unwarranted difficulty
in ordinary cases . .. " 18 Although some commis-
41 Study Draft, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
1 STm, COMENT ON JusTiricAmoN AND ExcusE,
I WoRKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
REF RM OF FEDERAL CRnNAL LAWS 261, 270 (1968).
143 Id.
141 FINAL REPORT, supra note 4.
15 FINAL REPORT § 601, Comment, supra note 4.
I46 Id.
sioners felt that the Code should explicitly recog-
nize that avoidance of harm is a privilege of the
citizen, the majority concluded that codification,
as opposed to case-by-case prosecution discretion,
is premature."'
Without a statutory definition of the defense of
necessity, criminal defendants in federal cases
must continue to seek necessity instructions to
the jury in the face of unreceptive courts. Section
608 or a similar codification would give the defense
of necessity the recognition that it has traditionally
received in the common law cases. A statutory
basis for the defense will result in a uniformity
now lacking. Greater uniformity will enable trial
judges to decide more consistently whether the
defense is applicable or merely frivolously asserted.
When a person commits an allegedly criminal
act, especially when the act is done in opposition
to what that person considers an illegal govern-
ment activity, the danger of the abuse of prosecu-
torial discretion is great. In times past, jury nul-
lification instructions prompted juries to exercise
discretion if they thought defendants were being
unjustly prosecuted. Permitting juries to consider
the pleas of necessity is another way of assuring
that justice will not be abused by law. If it is
feared that permitting juries to consider the plea
of necessity in political cases will result in de-
fendants being acquitted of crimes committed to
protest government policies, "we would," in the
words of Judge Bazelon, "be far better advised to
ponder the implication of that result than to spend
our time devising stratagems which let us pretend
the power of nullification does not even exist." '
147 Id.
148 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1144
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C. J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1974]
